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SOME PROBLEMS IN SPECIAL ASSESSMENT
DISTRICT OBLIGATIONS
A STUDY OF MICHIGAN DRAIN BOND CASES
Irvin ~ong*

T

HE question of the jurisdiction of a board or officer authorized
to construct a local improvement and levy special assessments
therefor has always been troublesome, and is particularly so when
bonds or other obligations are issued in anticipation of the collection of
such assessments. A vast amount of litigation has occurred in Michigan
in recent years over drain district assessments, and bonds which such
districts have issued. While this is of primary interest to Michigan
lawyers and investors in public securities, many of the questions involved seem to be of such a general nature, so far as special assessment
procedure is concerned, as to warrant a consideration by lawyers elsewhere.
Jurisdiction of such a board or officer may be lacking because of mistakes in interpreting governing laws as to the territory in which the
improvement may be constructed, procedural steps to be taken, or the
character of the improvement to be constructed. The latter is most
troublesome, as the Michigan experience has shown, because of divergent views entertained as to what form the improvement may take to
be within the scope of the officer's jurisdiction, and the results so far
as creditors are concerned of an official error which the courts determine
to be jurisdictional.
As nearly as can be estimated, investors in bonds issued by Michigan
drainage districts have lost approximately six million dollars as a result
of judicial determinations of error on the part of drain commissioners
in planning drainage improvements in a form which the court has
disapproved long after the completion of the improvements, and long
after their benefit has been assured to the districts and their taxpayers.
The loss of so large an amount by investors who have purchased the
securities in good faith, and in reliance on the validity of official action,
is naturally disturbing and brings up many questions as to what could
have been done to avoid it, or what should be done in the future to
prevent a repetition.
The litigation 1 forming the subject of this study revolves around

*
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1
(a) Michigan Supreme Court or United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth
Circuit, held the following drains illegal: Southfield Storm Sewer Drain, Clinton
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the fundamental question of whether the improvement constructed in
purported compliance with drain district procedure is actually a drain
or a sewer. If determined to be the latter, the drain commissioner is
declared to have acted outside his jurisdiction, the assessments are held
to be void, and the bonds issued secured by the uncollected assessments
are also declared invalid. The numerous cases have occurred because
of the uncertainty of the criterion which distinguishes a drain from a
sewer. The simple test, once thought to be sufficient, of making the
term "drain" synonymous with "ditch," and applying the term "sewer''
to an underground conduit, has long since been discarded. It is now
clear that position in the ground, whether at the surface or beneath,
size, depth, cost, materials used and methods of design, furnish no
conclusive test. The orily criterion judicially expressed is that the thing
is a drain if its primary purpose is drainage, and a sewer if its primary
purpose is sewerage. Obviously this leaves abundant obscurity.
· The question is now probably moot so far as Michigan is conv. Spencer, 250 Mich. 135, 229 N.W. 609 (1930); Kinner v. Spencer, 257 Mich.
142, 241 N.W. 240 (1932); Nine Mile Halfway Drain, Township of Lake v. Millar,
257 Mich. 135, 241 N.W. 237 (1932); Bloomfield Village Drain District v. Keefe
(opinion covering four cases and involving five bond issues), (C.C.A. 6th, 1941) 119
F. (2d) 157; Ruddiman Valley No. 3 Drain, Township of Norton v. Cockerill, 265
Mich. 405, 251 N.W. 543 (1933); case involved only question of recovery of taxes;
Supreme Court accepted lower court's :finding that drain was illegal; Royal Oak No. 7
Storm Sewer Drain, (not to be confused with Royal Oak Drain referred to below),
Village of Oak Park Van Wagoner, 271 Mich. 450, 260 N.W. 743 (1935); City
of Highland Park v. Drain Commissioner, 300 Mich. 501, 2 N.W. (2d) 479 (1942);
Bloomfield Village Drain and Bloomfield No. 1 Storm Sewer Drain, Meyering Land
Company v. Spencer, 273 Mich. 703, 263 N.W. 777 (1935); Detroit Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. v. Oakland County, 284 Mich. 130, 278 N.W. 791 (1938); Bloomfield Village Drain District v. Keefe, (C.C.A. 6th, 1941) II9 F. (2d) 157; Martin
Drain and Branches, Centerline Relief Drain, held illegal in Bloomfield case opinion;
Nagel Arm, South Van Dyke, North Lorraine, Keefe v. Macomb County, (C.C.A.
6th, 1944) 140 F. (2d) 966.
.
(b) Drains held legal by these courts: Beyer Drain, Hankinson v. Deake, 265
Mich. 1, 251 N.W. 418 (1933); East Clawson Storm Sewer Drain, Village of Clawson v. Van Wagoner, 268 Mich. 148, 255 N.W. 743 (1934); Le Blanc Drain,
· Kennedy v. Dingman, 272 Mich. 24, 261 N.W. 123 (1935); Grosse Ile Tile Drain,
Detroit Trust Co. v. Dingman, 291 Mich. 170, 289 N.W. II8 (1939); Royal Oak
Drain, Royal Oak Drain District v. Keefe, (C.C.A. 6th, 1937) 87 F. (2d) 786.
During the interval between Kennedy v. Dingman and Meyering Land Company
v. Spencer, numerous decrees were entered in Oakland County holding practically
all drains in that county, not specifically mentioned above, valid, against taxpayers'
attacks charging that they were sewers. Appeals were not taken from these decrees. In 1939, by a judgment' in District Court, Western District of Michigan,
(opinion unreported) bonds ~ued by Ruddiman Valley No. 3 Drain District were
held valid on account of estoppel from bond recitals. No appeal was taken and
judgment was paid. _See Real Estate Exchange Corp. v. Drain Commissioner, 304
Mich. 596, 8 N.W. {2d) 652 (1943).

v.
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cerned.2 The different drainage projects, other than farm ditches,
either have been judicially pronounced drains or sewers or have been
recogniied as one or the other in compromises that have been made.
All built subsequent to I929 are valid, whether the one or the other,
because sewers are now permitted to be built under the drain law. The
cases, however, present some interesting incidental points which can be
profitably studied for their effect on other litigation probable to arise
over municipal bonds and special assessments. They go far beyond
Michigan law alone, and the specific law of drain districts.
Some of these incidental questions which probably will occur in
reading the brief review of the cases given here pertain to the following
subjects: Statutory construction-whether it should be broad or extremely strict after administrative interpretation and public acquiescence has resulted in the creation of rights and obligations. What is
meant by the term "jurisdiction" and "jurisdictional defects" as applied
to administrative officers and proceedings before them? How do we
distinguish between a jurisdictional defect and an irregularity? Can
any effective statutory provision be drafted to prevent collateral attack on special assessments? Is the long accepted doctrine of estoppel
by recitals in public bonds being so restricted as practically to annihilate
the rule? If so, is its place being filled by statutory enactments which
furnish an effective substitute?

I
DRAIN DISTRICTS AND DRAINAGE PROBLEMS IN SEMI-RURAL AREAS

Drain districts are at least quasi or implied corporations, whether
expressly called corporations or not. 3 Their one purpose is to build and
maintain a drainage improvement, and almost universally taxation
therefor is upon the benefit or special assessment basis. They are similar to road, port, fire control, irrigation and other districts which
2

Decisions in other states have discussed questions of the distinction between
drains and sewers, but these turned on questions of peculiar facts, shedding no light on
the problem so far as the Michigan cases are concerned. In the following the courts
said there was no distinction: City of Valparaiso v. Parker, 148 Ind. 379, 47 N.E.
330 (1897); Aldrich v. Paine, 106 Iowa 461, 76 N.W. 812 (1898); City of
Charleston v. Johnston, 170 Ill. 336, 48 N.E. 985 (1897); Barton v. Drainage
District No. 30, 174 Ark. 173, 294 S.W. 418 (1927); Atkinson v. City of Pine Bluff,
190 Ark. 65, 76 S.W. (2d) 982 (1934). A distinction was applied in Roehling v.
City of Cincinnati, 102 Ohio St. 460, 132 N.E. 60 (1921).
3
In Bloomfield Village Drain District v. Keefe, (C.C.A. 6th, 1941) 119 F.
(2d) 157, the court was obliged to consider whether a drain district was a corporation
within the meaning of federal statutes relating to diverse citizenship cases. It concluded
that it was an implied or quasi corporation because of its ability to incur debts in its
own name.
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possess no independent governing powers. They are not quite the same
as a special improvement district carved out of a city, county or township, which is merely a designated area in which special taxes may be
levied. They have enough corporate life to enable them, under their
governing statutes, to issue full faith and credit bonds to provide for
their capital . improvements. Since they obtain their revenues from
special assessments, they are affected by constitutional due process
clauses, which require considerably more care in fixing assessments
than do general taxes. The underlying laws must be designed to give
to their taxpayers notice of proceedings for their establishment, determinations of necessity, apportionment of costs approximately, at least,
in relation to benefits, and a fair and impartial hearing as to all important steps to be taken.
We have had drain districts in Michigan ever since pioneer days.
The laws governing them have been amended frequently, responding
to demands for their wider and more effective utilization. 4 The legislature has recognized their need to borrow funds and has given them
· power to issue bonds payable from future tax collections. It has imposed
the duty to levy deficiency taxes in order to insure full payment of the
bonds, and for a time between 1927 and 1937 even went so far as to
require general funds in county treasuries to support the bonds by
advances for their payment. The controversies which will be considered here all arose under the state of the law existing between 1923
and 1929, and particularly under those provisions which either indicate or limit the kind of drainage improvement which could be constructed, and those provisions intended to limit protests and objections
to the proceedings themselves, or by direct and timely appeal therefrom to the courts.
Although for many years prior to 192.0 drain districts were predominantly organized in agricultural areas, the law did not so restrict
them. Prior to that time there were none of those semi-urban areas
which now grow up around cities. 5 These areas are too sparsely popu4 All disputed drains referred to in the decisions mentioned in note l were built
between 1925 and 1929, whep. the statutes applicable thereto were the general codification of the drain laws, Act 316 Public Acts 1923, as amended by Act 365 of 1925,
and Act 331 of 1927. The latter act provides for advancement from county treasuries
to meet bond deficiencies, which was repealed in Act 14 of 1937, except as to bonds
issued subsequent to the e.ffective date of Act 331 of 1927. Act 318 of 1929 expressly
authorized the building of sewers, being apparently inspired by the claims in Clinton
v. Spencer, 250 Mich. 135, 229 N.W. 609 (1930), then pending in the state circuit
court.
5 The evidence in many of the cases referred to in note 1, as given by engineers
and officials, develops the fact that before the era of general ownership of automobiles
and good roads metropolitan areas did not spread out in the haphazard fashion now
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lated to call them urban, and yet too thickly populated to call them
rural. After that time drain districts began to be organized in such .
areas, many of which were rapidly developing, and which by this time
have become predominantly urban in their characteristics.
The normal drainage improvement in a farming territory is a
ditch, which generally furnishes adequate service, but ditches are neither economical nor efficient in a partially urbanized territory. Increase of impervious surfaces, through grading, road building and other
improvements, casts storm water too quickly into the drainage system,
requiring more efficient channels for its discharge. If the topography
is :flat, the ditches must be of considerable size-practically canals.
They occupy too much land, which is costly to acquire, and frequent
bridges must be constructed because of the multiplication of cross
roads. Subsequent maintenance cost is high because of such things as
vegetation and debris which collects in them and subsidence of banks.
In the long run it is, therefore, cheaper to put the drainage system in a
fairly populated territory underground, and generally beneath highways, since rights of way thereunder can be acquired at small cost.
Along with the need for better drainage in such semi-urbanized developments comes the need of an outlet for sanitary sewage. Demand
is insistent for clean and healthful surroundings, and the building of
drainage systems must take into consideration the fact that they will
be used in part as an outlet for such sewage.6 No additional cost is entailed
because of this, unless the building of a treatment plant is necessary
to avoid stream or lake pollution. The sewage :flow is a mere trickle
compared to the great volumes of storm water which must be accommodated after heavy rains or incident to rapidly ~elting snow. Unless
such systems are laid in heavily congested areas, no additional capacity
need be provided because sewage is to flow through the system.
When drain commissioners receive petitions for the organization of
drainage districts and the building of better drainage systems in areas
of this type, they naturally turned to the underground facility. They
could not reject the petitions on the ground that the land was too
thickly populated for the building of ditches, since the only limit to

.

prevalent. As cities grew beyond their bounds, new additions were laid out rather
compactly along transportation systems. Now farms and settled areas alternate, which
calls for the characterization of semi-urban areas as used above--a word frequently
appearing in the evidence.
6
In many of these areas a serious health menace existed. As new houses were built,
inside plumbing was installed. Water was obtained from extensions of city water
systems, or wells equipped with electric pumps and pressure tanks, and household
sewage discharged into roadside ditches, which soon became extremely foul and
rendered the whole drain system offensive.
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their territorial jurisdiction was that they could not build a drainage
system wholly within a city or village which had its own laws relating
to the subject. 7 Drain districts could embrace areas which were incorporated, and all municipalities could be taxed for the benefit received
from the improvement. 8 They, in turn, could use it as an outlet not
only for drainage, but also for sewage, by express statutory direction.
Putting the drainage system underground requires the laying of
pipes or conduits like those used in a city sewer system. Tile could be
used for the smaller conduits, but for the larger, concrete pipe segments or monolithic construction were necessary. Provisions for inlets
by means of catchbasins, risers and other devices used in city sewer
construction were unavoidable.
Admiajstrative interpretation of the drain law to the effect that
anything appropriate to serve the drainage function and permit the
use of these structures for the riddance of any unwanted water, whether
clean or polluted, seemed clear. The legislature had not forbidden anything deemed appropriate. There was no attempt in the statute to
define the term "drain." It contained an interpretation clause 9 to the
effect that the term should be deemed to include "any watercourse or
ditch opened or proposed to b~ opened and improved for the purpose
of drainage, and any artificial ditch or drain levee, dyke or barrier
or tile drain proposed or constructed for such purpose, structures and
such mechanical devices as will properly purify the flow of such
. drains." Dictionaries consulted indicated that in common usage a drain
could be any .conduit, pipe or trench designed to remove water, or a
sewer or sink. By the legislative direction as to what the term ~as
deemed to include, it appeared certain that those things named as inclusions were not intended to limit the natural meaning of the word.
Nor did it appear that the legislature intended that they should be
built only for surface water drainage, for it had authorized the building
of disposal plants for putj.fication of their flow and had directed that
villages, cities and townships should be permitted to use them as
sewage outlets.
On this interpretation several hundreds of miles of underground
7

Fuller v. Cockerill, 257 Mich. 35, 239 N.W. 293 (1932).
Assessments against political subdivisions are called "at large" assessments. The
state could be assessed for benefits to state highways, the county for county highways,
townships and cities for general benefits, and, after the 1927 amendment, villages
could also be assessed.
9 A distinction must be recognized between a definition clause in a statute, and
one that merely says that word shall .be deemed to include certain things not embraced
within the usual meaning of the term. Such a clause extends the meaning, but does
not limit it to those things it is deemed to include. Uravic v. Jarka Co., 282 U.S.
234, 51 S.Ct. 111 (1931); Arrigo v. Hyers, 98 Neb. 134, 152 N.W. 319 (1915);
State v. Standard Oil Co., 61 Ore. 438, 123 P. 40 (1912).
8
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conduits were built as county drains, and at an estimated aggregate cost
in excess of $r2,ooo,ooo. None of these could be called sanitary sewers,
according to the engineers' concept of a pipe intended to receive only
sanitary refuse. They were all designed for storm water capacities,
and all were expected to receive some sanitary fl.ow. In two instances
disposal plants or settling basins were constructed to purify the fl.ow.
Engineers call them combined sewers because of this dual function.
Popularly they were called sewers, because of their resemblance to
city sewers.

II

•
DEVELOPMENT OF TAXPAYERS'

CoNTESTS OVER AssESSMENT FOR

UNDERGROUND DRAINS

All but one of these structures, which subsequently became the
subject of litigation, were completed and operating long before any
challenge was made to the correctness of the administrative interpretation of the term "drain." Bonds issued to provide construction costs
were readily sold, had a wide market, and bond obligations were
promptly met until r93r. Even then most of the districts had sizable
surpluses in their sinking funds. With only one exception, these improvements were accepted as necessary for the comfort, welfare and
further development of the communities which they served, and were
utilized as rapidly as community growth permitted.
The one exception arose in the case of an improvement projected
toward the end of the building of these structures.10 The challenge
came during the course of construction, by a few taxpayers who had
not received the statutory notice to which they were entitled and
who protested against the inclusion of their property in the district and
the heavy assessment against them. Aroused too late to take the statutory method of testing the legality of the proceedings, they sued collaterally. A measure of relief was given by the trial court, involving
hearings before the administrative tribunal to determine the propriety
of including their property in the district, but this was not satisfactory
to them and they appealed, arguing that such an underground improvement was unauthorized under the drain law.
The Supreme Court agreed with this argument, and, in a decision
criticizing the drain commissioner for various irregularities in the proceedings,11 held that the drain law was intended only for farm drain10 Most of the larger structures were built prior to I 929. By that time those
most needed because of the development of the areas had either been completed or
were being completed.
.
11
There was considerable justice in this criticism. The complaining landowners
had farms somewhat outside the developing areas, and it appeared that their lands
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age, that a sewer and a drain were two wholly different kinds of
improvements, that it is the purpose of a city sewer to remove in a short
time surface water and sewage, and this could not be the purpose of a
drain. A drain could only be projected for the purpose of drainage of
farm lands in an inexpensive manner. ·
A flood of litigation then started. Practically each underground
drainage improvement was attacked by taxpayers who claimed that
such an improvement had no legal status as a drain, and that assessments therefor could not be levied. 12 The bonds being payable to
bearer, bondholders could not be identified and were not joined as
parties. The defendants were the officers charged with the duty of
levying and collecting assessments.
This litigation was at first defended principally on the ground of
estoppel. A well-known principle in special assessment procedure was
invoked, that those who promoted a public improvement, or acquiesced in its construction, had no standing to complain after they had
received its benefit.13 Defendants also relied on the so-called certiorari
provision of the drain law, which gave objectors the right to appeal to
the courts by certiorari taken within a specified time and forbidding any
question thereafter of the legality of the drain or assessment therefor.
These defenses were all brushed aside on the ground that a complaint
of this nature attacked the jurisdiction of the commissioner, and could
be raised in a collateral suit. Little by little, however, officers began to
defend vigorously on the ground that their original interpretation of
the law was correct, that is, that authority was conferred upon them to
build drains underground and to provide sanitary sewage service along
with drainage service by any appropriate means.J.4
Haltingly, and with some intermediate deviations, the court finally
were included in the district for no special reason except to include them in the
assessment roll. The size of the assessments rather shocked the court.
12
In one county the Board of Supervisors passed a resolution specifically inviting
the townships and other parties to bring suits to restrain assessments for all underground
drains, and directing county officials to render assistance in getting such suits started.
[Evidence in Keefe v. Royal Oak Drain District, (C.C.A. 6th, 1937) 87 F. (2d)
786.]
18
As a general proposition, courts look with disfavor upon suits brought by taxpayers in an assessment district who neglect to protest against proceedings of which
they have actual or imputed knowledge until it is too late to correct illegal action.
Suits of this nature are frequently dismissed on the ground of laches, or application of
the "clean hands" rule. Atwell v. Barnes, 109 Mich. 10, 66 N.W. 583 (1896);
Smith v. Carlow, II4 Mich. 67, 72 N.W. 22 (1897); Wilson v. Woolman, 133 Mich.
350, 94 N.W. 1076 (1903).
HHankinson v. Deake, 265 Mich. 1, 251 N.W. 418 (1933), decided by a
divided court, specifically recognized that resemblance to a city sewer was not objectionab1e. Because of reference to facts that pipes were sealed against sand, but not
ground water, and the drain commissioner intended to require householders to install
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swung over to that view,15 and in the last of the taxpayers' cases, decided in 1939, Detroit Trust Co. v. Dingman,16 it expressed itself fully
in accord with the original administrative determination. It there recognized the authority of the drain commissioner to build the kind of
structure appropriate for the district it was designed to serve. It could
be of any appropriate material, deep in the ground, capable of removing both surface water and sanitary sewage, and the treatment of the
same;-in short, it could do all things expected of a city sewer.11 It
must, however, be predominantly intended for land drainage, with the
sanitary purpose no more than incidental. The court, however, did
not overrule its prior decisions contrary to this theory, and when subsequent cases came before it involving projects previously declared
illegal, it adhered to its prior rulings in connection with that particular
project on the ground that the matter was stare decisis.

III
BoNDHOLDERS' SuITs TO ENFORCE BoNDS IssuED FOR DRArns,
CLAIMED TO BE SEWERS

Long before Detroit Trust Co. v. Dingman was decided, bondholders organized for their protection. A committee was formed, which
septic tanks through which their sewage was to discharge into the drain, the decision
was not considered to be fully in accord with the prior administrative interpretation.
15
In Village of Clawson v. Van Wagoner, 268 Mich. 148, 255 N.W. 743
( 1934), the drain started in village territory to which it gave complete sanitary service,
but a large part of it was in farm land, where it received only surface water. It was,
however, completely underground. The court considered that taxpayers had not shown
that the primary purpose was sanitary. In Kennedy v. Dingman, 272 Mich. 24, 261
N.W. 123 (1935), the court approved the trial court's opinion, deploring the necessity
of resorting to superfine distinctions to determine the commissioner's jurisdiction.
The improvement here was the converse of the one in the Clawson case, in that the
town property served already had a sanitary sewer, and only storm water was there
removed, while in the portion of the district outside of the town, both sanitary sewage
and storm water was transported. Held to be a drain because the primary purpose
appeared to be land drainage. Reversions to the original idea expressed in the Clinton
case occurred in Village of Oak Park v. Van Wagoner, 271 Mich. 450, 260 N.W. 743
(1935), where the court said the improvement was a typical combined sewer, and in
Meyering Land Co. v. Spencer, 273 Mich. 703, 263 N.W. 777 (1935) and Detroit
F. & M. Co. v. Oakland County, 284 Mich. 130, 278 N.W. 791 (1938), wherein the
court considered that natural drainage was sufficient; hence it must have been built
for sanitary purposes only. The court thus inferentially holds that the express finding
of necessity by the independent tribunal convened in the drain proceedings is open to
collateral attack at any time.
16
291 Mich. 170, 289 N.W. II8 (1939).
17
This is the first case in which the court called specific attention to the provisions of the statute authorizing the use of county drains as a sewage outlet, and those
provisions relating to disposal plants. It also pointed out the inequity of plaintiffs'
claim, in view of their petitions and complete knowledge as to how the project was
to be built.

920
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brought class actions 18 in the federal courts. These were started before
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 19 was decided, and when there were
various advantages in federal court suits on municipal bonds as compared to suits in the state, courts. In one of these they were successful,20 the court holding that the improvement was a legal drain,
expressing itself along the lines of the opinion of the later decided DetrQit Trust Co. v. Dingman, but in accord with certain Michigan decisions which had preceded it.21 All subsequent suits were adverse to
bondholders, and from these the principal loss of six million dollars
has been sustained.
The next group of four cases 22 coming before the United States
courts of appeals differed from the case referred to in the previous
paragraph orily in that the projects involved had previously been decided to be illegal in Michigan taxpayers' cases-some by the Michigan Supreme Court, others by the circuit courts. There was no fundamental difference in the character of the different structures, except
that in conjunction with one of the projects a disposal plant had been
built as part of the proceedings. They were all large and costly, and
intended to serve as an outlet for storm water and sanitary sewage.
The cases were heard. in the district court. by a special master, who
found that the improvements were all sewers, as they also had been
determined by the Michigan courts. Detroit Trust Co. v. Dingman
had not then been decided, so he did not have the benefit of the
Michigan court's last decision on the subject. He considered that if
there was an intent that the improvement should serve the entire area
for both drainage and sanitary purposes, did not have porous joints to
18
A committee he,aded by Kenneth M. Keefe was organized, which received
deposits of all·of the questioned bonds. Suits were brought in equity in behalf of all
holders of the bonds of the respective districts, to restrain diversions of the drain funds,
to compel the levy of assessments and recognition of the validity of the bonds.
19
304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938).
20
Royal Oak Drain District v. Keefe, (C.C.A. 6th, 1937) 87 F. (2d) 786.
While this case was decided before the Erie Railroad Co. case, the court rested its
decision squarely on Michigan law.
21
The court's opinion indicates that according to Michigan law as laid down
in Hankinson v. Deake, 265 Mich. 1, 251 N.W. 418 (1933); Village of Clawson v.
Van Wagoner, 268 Mich. 148, 255 N.W. 743 (1934); and Kennedy v. Dingman,
272 Mich. 24, 261 N.W. 123 (1935), the presumption of legality must be accepted,
and that position in the ground, size, materials used and engineering features are not
criteria. Although the project was intended to receive the sewage from numerous
cities and villages, the court held it to be predominantly a drain, with sewage service
only incidental.
.
22
This pertained to five 'drai"hs, as noted in note 1, supra. An effort was made
to have the decision reviewed by the United States Supreme Court, but certiorari was
denied. 314 U.S. 649, 62 S.Ct. 95 (1941).
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take in subsoil water, and if raw sewage was allowed to enter, it could
not be considered a drain in the statutory sense of the term. Notwithstanding this finding, he recommended a decree for bondholders, finding that they were bona fide holders and concluding that the recitals
in the bonds· of conformity with the drain law estopped the districts
and their taxpayers to claim that the improvements were not drains. 23
The district judge confirmed the master's report 24 and entered decrees
for the bondholders, from which defendants appealed.
The circuit court of appeals, in an opinion covering the four cases,
Bloomfield Village Drain District v. Keefe, 25 reversed these decrees
and dismissed bondholders' bills of complaint. It refused to disturb
the master's finding as to illegality of the projects, saying that bondholders were foreclosed from asserting the contrary by reason of decrees entered against the drain commissioners in the prior taxpayers'
suits. It arrived at this rather novel conclusion from the drain law
provision to the e:ffect tha:t the drain commissioner is a necessary party
to any suit brought by a taxpayer which attacks the validity of the
drain proceedings or the taxes therein levied. 26 From this it inferred
that the law of Michigan constituted a drain commissioner such a representative of creditors that anything decided against him became res
23
The master gave a very clear exposition of the law as to the effect of bond
recitals as developed in the United States Supreme Court, and held that Michigan
law on the subject was in accord. Noting that the formal parts of the drain proceedings presented no evidence that anything other than drains were intended, that no
certain determinations could be made from plans to indicate that the purpose was predominantly for sewage removal, and that such determination must be made from
various surrounding circumstances, such as topography, economic development, motives
of inhabitants and officials, he concluded that these cases called particularly for the
application of the rule of estoppel from bond recitals, since these facts were peculiarly
within the knowledge of the issuing officials and aould not be known by bond purchasers.
u The district judge in his opinion called particular attention to the decision
of his brother jurist, Judge Raymond, the District Judge of the Western District of
Michigan, who had upheld the validity of a drain bond issue on the ground of the
bond recitals alone. Judge Raymond served as a member of the United States court of
appeals when it decided Royal Oak Drain District v. Keefe.
25
(C.C.A. 6th, 1941) II9 F. (2d) 157.
26
Michigan Drain Law, Mich. Laws (1923) Act. 316, c. 10, § 14, provides
that in any suit brought to set aside any drain tax or in any way attacking the legality
of the proceedings, the drain commissioner shall be joined as a party. In Godkin v.
Rutterbush, 147 Mich. n6, IIO N.W. 505 (1907), the court said that the purpose
of this was to enable the commissioner, rather than some other county official, to
defend, because "in a peculiar sense he stands as the representative of those who are
interested in the drain and in the collection of the tax." This decision was rendered
long before drain districts could issue bonds, and in no way suggested that bondholders'
rights could be affected by such suit. Cf. Kinner v. Spencer, 257 Mich. 142, 241
N.W. 240 (1932), where the Michigan court declined to make any decree specifically
dealing with the bonds which had been issued.
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judicata against bondholders, notwithstanding complete absence of
notice to them of the pendency of the suit. Happily this unusual interpretation of the drain law was soon thereafter repudiated by the Michigan Supreme Court 21 and should give no trouble in future litigation.
Estoppel by recital in bond. The court then passed to a consideration of the ground on which bondholders were given relief. The
court did not consider that a bond recital was sufficient where couched
in general terms, representing that the bonds were issued under authority and in full compliance with the drain law referred to by the numbers
of the-Michigan Public Acts, and further certifying the due happening,
existence and performance of all conditions precedent to make them
binding obligations. The court asserted that defendants were not alleging matters in conflict with these representations when they claimed
that the improvements planned in the proceedings were not, in fact,
drains.-:is
Because the Michigan courts had held that a drain commissioner
acted outside his jurisdiction in planning and building a sewer instead
of a drain, he was deprived of authority to bind the districts by any
bond recitals. Although there were cited numerous decisions from
Michigan and elsewhere, which held municipalities estopped by recitals
of a lawful purpose of a bond issue where the actual purpose of the
issuing officials was to use the bond proceeds for some ultra vires
purpose,29 the court brushed these aside on the ground that in such
21

City of Highland Park v. Drain Commissioner, 300 Mich. 501, 2 N.W. (2d)
479 (1942).
-:is The court's language was as follows: "The bonds do not recite that the various
projects have been determined to be drains rather than sewers, and hence the appellants, in seeking to show that they are in fact sewers and illegal, are not seeking to
establish any facts inconsistent with the recitals." Contrast this with Dillon, citing
Dixon Countyv. Field, I I I U.S. 83 at 93, 4 S.Ct. 315 (1884) and Comanche County
v. Lewis, 133 U.S. 198 at 206, 10 S.Ct. 286 (1890), who says: "It is not necessary
that the recital should enumerate each particular fact essential to the existence of the
obligation. A general statement that the bonds have been issued in conformity with
the law will suffice to embrace every fact which the officers making the statement are
authorized to determine and certify." 2 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS, 5th ed.,
§ 928 (1911). Furthermore, it is not essential that there be a prior determination of
the existence of an essential fact by the officer or tribunal empowered to issue the
bonds. "The recital is itself a decision by the tribunal." 2 DILLON, MUNICIPAL
CoRPORATIONS, § 926 (1911); Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U.S. 484 (1875).
29
Bonds actually issued in aid of a railroad, a wholly ultra vires purpose under
constitutional interpretations, but reciting a lawful municipal purpose. Recitals held
to create estoppel. Common Council v. Schlich, 81 Mich. 405, 45 N.W. 994 (1890);
Risley v. Howell, (C.C.A. 6th, 1894) 64 F. 453; Defiance v. Schmidt, (C.C.A. 6th,
1903) 123 F. I; Bonds actually issued to induce location of factory in village, but
reciting issuance for municipal improvements, same holding. Thompson v. Village of
Mecosta, 127 Mich. 522, 86 N.W. 1044 (1901); Schmid v. Village of Frankfort,
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cases the municipalities themselves participated in the false recital. It
did not explain this distinction, but perhaps we may infer that it considered that voted bonds stood on a different basis from those which
were authorized without a bond election.30 Those Michigan dedsions 31
which followed the principal in Dixon County v. Field, to the effect
that an officer's recital was worthless as to matters in a public record
such as an assessment list, to which the public were referred as the test
of a fact, were considered applicable. Accordingly the court held that
the drain commissioner's recital as to due performance of conditions
precedent bound no one.
Several years later the same court adhered to this decision in another case involving bonds issued by three other drain districts.82
Following closely upon the Bloomfield decision the Michigan Supreme Court considered a mandamus case 83 brought by holders of
bonds of a district whose improvement it had previously declared to be
a sewer in a taxpayers' suit. Although the court rejected the court of
131 Mich. 197, 91 N.W. 131 (1902). Numerous other similar cases of this type cited
86 A.L.R. 1087 (1933). In Caldwell v. Guardian Trust Co., (C.C.A. 8th, 1928)
26 F. (2d) 218, bonds of an Arkansas drainage district contested on ground that
sewer was constructed where only ditches permitted. Recitals held effective. Same
result in City of Hughes Springs v. Lips, (C.C.A. 5th, 1941) I 18 F. (2d) 238, where
bonds were issued for municipal building claimed to be primarily an auditorium, an
unauthorized purpose.
80
Where vote of the electorate is required, it does not confer power, but is
merely a test of popular sentiment, required as a condition to the exercise of the power.
In none of the cases where a vote was taken did it appear that the bond form was
submitted and approved by voters. They merely voted that bonds be issued for the
proper municipal purpose.
81
Spitzer v. Village of Blanchard, 82 Mich. 234, 46 N.W. 400 (1890); First
Wisconsin Bank v. Bessemer Township, 286 Mich. 426, 282 N.W. 203 (1938).
Either the constitution or governing statute may prohibit creation of debt in excess
of a given percentage of assessed valuation as shown by last assessment roll. Issuing
officers are not deemed authorized to recite that the bonds are within the debt limit
where they show on their face the amount of the debt, and reference to the assessment
roll would show that the percentage was exceeded. The roll is the best evidence of
the fact, and legislation impliedly refers the purchaser to it rather than the officer.
See distinction expressed in Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Oakland County, 264
Mich. 673, 251 N.W. 395 (1933), based on Chaffee County v. Potter, 142 U.S.
355, 12 S.Ct. 216 (1892); Gunnison County Commissioners v. Rollins, 173 U.S.
255, 19 S.Ct. 390 (1899), where amount of debt was not shown by the bonds. That
fact being peculiarly within the knowledge of issuing officers, their recital is binding.
An opinion by Cochran, District Judge, in Dietrich v. Bath County, (C.C. Ky.
1909) 292 F. 279, contains an excellent analysis of debt limitation cases. In the First
Wisconsin Bank Case, the township notes were incomplete until an approval certificate
was issued by the State Treasurer. Officers could not certify to completion of instrument, where law coupled with the method of execution showed it to be incomplete.
82
III U.S. 83, 4 S.Ct. 315 (1884).
88
Keefe v. Macomb County, (C.C.A. 6th, 1944) 140 F. (2d) 966.
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_appeals theory that this prior suit was res judicata because the drain
commissioner had been sued, it declined to consider bondholders' claim
that t}J.e improvement was a legal project, saying that stare decisis
foreclosed such inquiry. Two opinions were written, signed by all the
judges. In one of them it declared itself in agreement with the court
of appeals in rejecting the proposition of estoppel from bond recitals; 84
in the other it declared that holders of bonds were charged with notice
that the so-called drain was not a drainage improvement, because the
name given to it was "Royal Oak No. 7 Storm Sewer Drain." It said
there was no authority in law for the construction of a sewer drain. 85 No
mention was made of the obvious fact that the name ''storm sewer" is
suggestive of a drain intended to remove only storm water, having
nothing to do with sani uy sewage removal, nor with the fact that only
a few years before it L d declared that a similarly denominated improvement, East Clawson Storm Sewer Drain, was a legal drain.86
Readers will be naturally interested to know whether bondholders
were denied all salvage rights. The circuit court of appeals denied
petitions for rehearings, which included claims that funds in excess of
$200,000 should be distributed to the bondholders even though the
bonds were invalid. This money representing the excess of collections
over bond and interest payments thereby remained with the counties,
no suits being maintainable by taxpayers to recover it, because not paid
under protest or sued for within the short limitation period prescribed
for such suits.87 The counties thus found the litigation quite profitable
as a means to enrich their treasuries. The Michigan Supreme Court,
• 3¼ City of Highland Park v. Drain Commissioner, 300 Mich. 501, 2 N.W.
(2d) 479 (1942).
'
35
Speaking of bond issues, where precedent conditions essential to validity do not
exist or have not been performed, the court says at p. 509: "The validity of such issues
depends upon the facts and circumstances under which they were issued. • • • The
Federal courts likewise recognize the Michigan rule here repeated, that the drain
district or municipality is not estopped from denying validity of a bond issue on the
ground of total lack of jurisdiction." This seems a clear repudiation of Thompson
v. Village of Mecosta, 127 Mich. 522, 86 N.W. 1044 (1901), and Village of Frankfort v. Schmid, 131 Mich. 197, 91 N.W. 131 (1902), where officers were engaged
in an illegal plan of loaning municipal credit for a private enterprise. It surely would
seem that they and the villages were acting outside jurisdiction; yet recitals were held
effective.
86 Bonds recited compliance with the drain law, specifying statutes by proper
designation and that they were issued to provide cost of construction of Royal Oak
No. 7 Storm Sewer Drain. They contained the usual certificate as to due performanace,
etc. of conditions precedent. No mention of "sewer drain" appeared except as it was
part of the name adopted for the improvement. Since drains must be designed pri~
marily to remove storm .water, and a storm sewer is limited to such purpose, how does
the name indicate a purpose to transport sanitary sewage to an unlawful degree?
87 Village of Clawson v. Van Wagoner, 268 Mich. 148, 255 N.W. 743 (1934).
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however, later accepted the view that money in the drain fund belonged to bondholders,88 and while this could not aid holders of bonps
in those cases which had been before the court of appeals, it did enable
them to get some salvage out of other bonds. They could not, however,
sue for money had and received,89 which necessarily would mean the
establishment of an implied contract where an express contract had been
held absolutely void, and except where portions of the drain property
had been abandop.ed because of changes in the improvement, they were
not permitted to reach the property on the theory of a constructive
trust in the bond proceeds.40
The aggregate loss to bondholders is now established, and all avenues of effective redress cut off. The loss probably is in excess of
$6,000,000 and affects many hundreds of investors in Michigan and
elsewhere. The drains, or sewers, still function and have contributed
to the development of the communities. No one in Michigan, except
bondholders and those who have labored in their behalf, seems to consider the result unjust, but that is probably because only those affected
have been interested in the decisions that have been reached. The only
complaints so far heard are from taxpayers in districts whose bonds
have been held valid, who feel that they are victims of unjust discrimination and that they too should have been relieved of the assessments.

IV
PossIBLE EFFECTS OF DRAIN BoND DECISIONS

The important points now to be considered are to what extent these
decisions will tend to produce like results when other public obligations
are called in question. The reputation of the two courts which have
given these decisions is deservedly high and influential. Will the decisions be blindly followed or critically considered?
Construction of Statutes
A comparison of the first decision which opened the Pandora box
of troubles, Clinton v. Spencer,41 and the last case in !'{hich the MichiI.

88
Act 316, Mich. Laws (1923) § 5 c-10; Brooks v. Oakland County, 268 Mich.
637, 256 N.W. 576 (1934).
89
City of Highland Park v. Royal Oak No. 7 Drain District, 309 Mich. 646,
16 N.W. (2d) 106 (1944).
.
40
McCurdy v. Shiawassee County, 154 Mich. 550, II8 N.W. 625 (1908);
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Middleport, 124 U.S. 534, 8 S.Ct. 625 (1888); DILLON,
MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATioNs, 5th ed., § 961 (19u).
41
Newberry v. Nine Mile Halfway Drain District, 319 Mich.- 568, 30 N.W.
(2d) 430 (1948).
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gan court passed upon the validity of a drainage improvement,42 unaffected by an embarrassing prior decision relating to the same project,
indicates differences of viewpoint in the construction of statutes relating
to public improvements. Should the court be strict or liberal, should
practical construction by administrative officers long prior to judicial
pronouncements carry weight? Should general acquiescence by members of the public enjoying the benefit of such interpretations have
significance? In an early Michigan decision,43 Judge Cooley remarked
as follows: "There is a principle of law that municipal powers are to
be strictly interpreted and it is a just and wise rule. Municipalities are
to fake nothing from the general sovereignty except what is expressly
granted. But when a power is conferred which in its exercise concerns
only the municipality, and can wrong or injure no one, there is not
the slightest reason for any strict or literal interpretation with a view
to narrowing its construction. If the parties concerned have adopted a
particular construction not manifestly erroneous, and which wrongs
no one, and the State is in no manner concerned, the construction ought
to stand. That is good sense, and it is the application of correct principles in municipal affairs." Judge Dillon, in his work, Municipal Corporations, expresses the same view.«

Collateral Att_ack after Improvement is Completed
The Michigan courts have in this series of cases developed a point
which may be troublesome in curtailing collateral attack against the
validity of special assessments. There seems to be a disposition on the
part of taxpayers in special assessment districts to stand by in apparent
acquiescence while the proceedings are in progress, and wait until the
improvement is complete before searching for errors on which to base
a claim that the tax is void. Without reference to any statutory restriction, suits of this nature are often dismissed for !aches or other similar
grounds. Many statutes and charters contain provisions similar to our
2.

42

Detroit Trust Co. v. Dingman, 291 Mich. 170, 289 N.W. II8 (1939).
Port Huron v. McCall, 46 Mich. 565 at 574, IO N.W. 23 (1881).
«DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 5th ed.,§ 883 (19u). " ••• But it has
nevertheless been held that when a statute under which .a municipal corporation has
exercised the power of issuing bonds is fairly susceptible of different interpretations, and
its right to issue the bonds is in a measure doubtful, the fact that they were issued by the
municipality without protest on the part of any of its citizens and sold for value, and
that they have been recognized by the municipality and the inhabitants for a term of
years, and that the interest payable thereon has been levied and collected in the meantime without objection, will entitle the innocent holder of the bonds to a more liberal
interpretation of the powers of the municipality than would have been permissible
if the right to issue the bonds had been challenged when they were issued or shortly
thereafter."
I
43
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drain law, which has come to be called the certiorari provision. The
party desiring to object to any defect in the drain proceedings must
apply to the court at specified times, so regulated that the objection
must be made before work has started. The filing of such application
automatically holds up the work, and the court must promptly pass
upon the question. The law then provides, "If no certiorari be brought
within the time herein prescribed, the drain shall be deemed to have
been legally established, and the legality of said drain and the taxes
.therefor shall not thereafter be questioned in any suit at law or equity."
This has been a provision in our drain law for at least sixty years, and
has often been invoked. In Township of Clarence v. Dickinson,415 the
claim was made that this only served to cut off complaints in collateral
suits based upon irregularities, but that it could not be effective against
more fundamental errors which might be termed jurisdictional. In
passing on this the court recognized that the error complained of was
the kind previously considered as jurisdictional, but it said there are
two kinds of jurisdictional defects-one which comes from a violation
of the constitution, and one coming from a violation of the statute
only. The provision was construed as a curative measure going to the
limit of legislative power, by which the legislature intended to ratify
and confirm all assessments resulting from erroneous proceedings, in
the absence of a certiorari attack, unless the defect was of a constitutional nature, beyond the ·power of the legislature to authorize in the
first instance. An illustration of defects of this nature was absence
of due process resulting from want of notice or a fair hearing, which,
unless required, would render unconstitutional any special assessment
statute.
3. Application of Due Process
Confronted with the Township of Clarence case, and the obvious
fact that it was competent for the legislature to permit drain districts
to be organized for sewer building,46 the court adhered to the decision
but said that violation of due process would occur when an illegal drain
was built and assessments were levied, because the levy would deprive
the taxpayer of property without due process/7 This seems to be an
415

Township of Clarence v. Dickinson, 151 Mich. 270, u5 N.W. 57 (1908),
followed in Heliker v. Oakland County, 216 Mich. 595, 185 N.W. 842 (1921);
Stellwagen v. Dingman, 229 Mich. 159, 200 N.W. 983 (1924); Anderson v. Road
Commissioners, 268 Mich. 643, 256 N.W. 578 (1934); Altermatt v. Dillman, 269
Mich. 177, 256 N.W. 846 (1934). ·
46
Township of Warren v. Engelbrecht, 251 Mich. 608,232 N.W. 346 (1930).
47
First announced in Village of Oak Park v. Van Wagoner, 271 Mich. -4-50,
260 N.W. 743 (1935). Reiterated in Fuller v. Cockerill, 257 Mich. 35, 239 N.W.
293 (1932) and Altermatt v. Dillman, 269 Mich. 177, 256 N.W. 846 (1934).
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erroneous conception of due process, quite contrary to accepted doctrines
on the subject.48 On this basis proceedings, either judicial or administrative, would be endless. The defendant adjudged liable in a civil
suit, or a defendant convicted on a criminal charge, could always collaterally attack the judgment on the ground that the decision was contrary to his legal rights, and its effect would be the deprivation of
property or liberty without due process. The general understanding
of due process is that it guarantees only fairness in procedure, that is,
reasonable notice, specification of complaint, and a hearing before a fair
and impartial tribunal. It does not insure the correctness of the decision
reached. Administrative tribunals vested with quasi-judicial powers
must be governed, by the same principle. It would seem correct to
consider that any errors in designing a drain which made it too large,
too· costly, or involved a too complete sanitary function, would be nonjurisdictional-merely an error in the exercise of jurisdiction ..

4. Jurisdictional. Defects and Irregularities
In one of the cases 49 the court buttresses its argument that the
commissioner lost jurisdiction by providing for a structure which it
deemed to be a sewer, by saying that no one would question the proposition that a · drain commissioner who received a petition to build a
drain, and nevertheless proceeded to construct a road and levy assessments therefor, would be acting without jurisdiction, and that the assessments would be void. The assumption is there made that there is
the same degree of difference between a legal drain and an illegal
sewer as between a drain and a road. Of course, this is a farfetched
analogy,5° quite evident when one considers the difficulties often recognized by the court in declaring whether a given project should be called
a drain or a sewer. When the members of the court reach different
conclusions on the same facts, as happened in one case,61 it can hardly be
said_ that a commissioner's erroneous decision on such a point amounts
to a jurisdictional defect in the proceedings. If it were not for the fact
that the r929 amendment to the drain law removed this question from
48
Chicago Life Insurance Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25 at 30, 37 S.Ct. 492
(1917), per Holmes: ''Whenever a wrong judgment is entered against a defendant his
property is taken when it should not have been, but whatever the ground may be, if
the.mistake is not so gross as to be impossible in a rational administration of justice,
it is no more than the imperfection of man, not a denial of constitutional rights."
49
Township of Lake v. Millar, 257 Mich. 135, 241 N.W. 237 (1932).
ro The supposed situation of a drain commissioner building a road when petitioned to build a drain would seem to be a mistake "so gross as to be impossible in
a rational administration of justice," as stated in the case referred to in note 48.
61
Hankinson v. Deake, 265 Mich. 1, 251 N.W. 418 (1933).
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later proceedings, a drain commissioner familiar with all the court's decisions would now be completely in the dark as to what he should do if
the appropriate kind of structure for the district were anything other
than an open ditch. He might reasonably be expected to conclude that
the last case on the subject expressed the law, but he would not know
until his plan and all surrounding circumstances were judicially considered that he would be correct in his decision. There has never been
announced any more workable criterion than the statement that an
improvement must be intended primarily for drainage, and no more
than incidentally for sewerage.52 How to measure the permissible
incidental purpose has never been disclosed.

5. Estoppel by Recital in Bond
Heretofore recitals in bonds have been the most effective protection
to bondholders against the assertion of facts contrary to their validity.
The effect 'of such recitals, the form they should take, the officer empowered to make them binding upon the issuing body, were thoroughly
expounded in a long line of cases by the United States Supreme Court.58
Before Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, bondholders almost invariably
52

''We repeat that the controlling legal distinction between sewers and drains
is the primary purpose of the structure which determines its character regardl~ of
what may be purely incidental purposes." Highland Park v. Drain Commissioner,
300 Mich. 501; 2 N.W. (2d) 479 (1942).
58
The doctrine of estoppel from bond recitals as laid down by the United States
Supreme Court is admirably explained by DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 5th ed.,
§ 903, et seq. (1911), with copious references to the decisions. The doctrine recognizes that municipalities have no inherent power to issue bonds, and that legislative
authorization usually lays down conditions under which the power may be exercised.
Before the bonds are issued, strict compliance with the conditions may be judicially
enforced, but after they are issued a proper recital in the bonds as to compliance with
the governing statute or provisions of the constitution will estop the municipality
from defeating the obligation in the hands of a bona fide holder by the assertion of
non-existence or non-performance of many of the conditions. There is no estoppel
against urging absence of a grant of legislative power and proper execution of the
bonds, but many of the conditions whose existence or performance are matters peculiarly within the knowledge of the issuing officer are thereafter not open to question,
for example, the absence of a proper popular vote, petition or ordinance, or an unlawful purpose. In some situations (see note 30) recitals may even foreclose inquiry as
to whether the debt incurred exceeds the debt limit. The rule is based on the theory
that the legislature intends to authorize bonds having the quality of commercial paper,
and that generally those facts as to existence and performance of precedent conditions
are presumed to be committed for determination to the issuing officers, whose certificate included in the bonds constitutes a determination binding on the municipality.
If this were not so, and holders were obliged to prove each time interest matured, and
transferees were obliged to. ascertain at their peril whether conditions existed or had
been performed, it would be useless to grant the power to issue bonds, as it could not
be used. Coloma v. Eaves, 92 U.S. 484 (1875).
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resorted to the federal courts for suits on their bonds, because in that
jurisdiction there was a clear body of governing jurisprudence. It was
not uncommon for holders who feared to sue in the state court, and
who could not sue in the federal court, to transfer their bonds to a
nonresident, ancl there has been much litigation over the question of
whether the·transfer was actual or sham. 54 Even though many state
courts expressed themselves in accord with federal decisions on the
subject of bond recitals, there was a general disposition to prefer the
federal courts because of the great mass of federal decisions on the
subject. This fine body of law, developed with great labor and thought,
is now on the shelf1 and the effect of bond recitals is merely what the
state courts in the jurisdiction of the issuing municipality say they are.
In Missouri,6 5 from the earliest times the courts steadfastly refused
to consider recitals of any effect. In New York they had some effect,
but not to the extent that the federal courts had decided. 56 In Michigan 57 there seemed to be a clear adoption of the federal rule, until the
drain bond case 58 was decided. Now the concluding statement in one
of the opinions in that case puts the whole matter on the question of
jurisdiction of the issuing officers-something that leaves the matter
still in doubt because of the uncertain meaning of the term "jurisdiction."
The havoc wrought by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins to this
protective principle might be of serious consequences to bondholders,
for there is still no dearth of municipal effort to repudiate bonds because
of some defect in performance of conditions precedent. The last
A .L.R. note on the subject 59 reviews thirty-three cases decided between
1933 and 1945, in which such claims were made, and the recitals were
interposed against them, which seems to indicate that in spite of careful
examination by specialists in bond proceedings,60 an ingenious attorney
5

~Williams v. Nottawa Township, 104 U.S. 209 (1881); Lake County v. Dudley, 173 U.S. 243, 19 S.Ct. 398 (1899).
55
Carpenter v. Lathrop, 51 Mo. 483 (1873); Thornburg v. School District, 175
Mo. 12, 23, 75 S.W. 81 (1903).
5
G Starin v. Genoa, 23 N.Y. 439 (1861); Cagwin v. Hancock, 84 N.Y. 532
(1881). There are many other decisions to like effect, but these sufficiently illustrate
the New York view.
57
Thompson v. Village of Mecosta, 127 Mich. 522, 86 N.W. 1044 (1901)
relied on numerous cases from the United States courts on the subject. Text writers
have concluded that this placed Michigan in accord with federal decisions. 6 McQuILLAN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs, 2d ed., § 2486 (1937).
58
Highland Park v. Drain Commissioner, 300 Mich. 501, 2 N.W. (2d) 479
(1942).
59
158 A.L.R. 938 (1945).
60 Many of the situations presented in the earlier cases could hardly arise now,
because of the thorough investigations by examining attorneys. Although not required
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for the municipality or its taxpayers can still turn up with a troublesome
defense.
6. Remedial Legislation
There is considerable ground to hope that the serious consequences
mentioned may have been averted by a legislative substitute applicable
to recent issues of bonds. The Michigan Municipal Finance Commission Act 61 now provides a sort of blue sky law for securities issued by
Michigan municipalities. Before they can issue bonds they must obtain
the approval of this commission. This act provides: "No order of the
commission permitting the issuance of any obligation shall be deemed
an approval of the legality thereof; provided, however, that any determination or finding made by the commission involving any question
of fact shall, after the issuance of such obligations, be deemed conclusive of such fact or facts." 62 And, "The issuance of the commission's
order granting permission to issue any obligations shall imply that the
commission has made such determination of fact or circumstances, has
given such approvals and has reached such opinions, as are a necessary
prerequisite to the issuance of such obligations in accordance with said
order." 63
The language of these provisions seems plain enough. The commission must decide that the municipality has complied with those conditions which are required to exist before the bonds can lawfully issue.
Its approval implies that it has so found, and becomes conclusive once
the bonds are issued. Assuming that the court so interprets it, there
should be no repetition of such debt repudiation as occurred in relation
to these drain bonds. There should be no uncertainty as to the commission's authority by its order of approval to put at rest every question of fact which could be asserted against the validity of the bonds.
Some other states have or have had similar enactments,6" and where
under the estoppel rule to investigate all proceedings taken by the issuing officers, this
invariably is done. A lack of popular vote where that is required could easily be detected, but not such defects as irregularities in the manner of conducting it, which
could rest in evidence entirely outside the record of the proceedings. Where a purpose
exists in the minds of officers, or others, not shown by the record, it could. hardly be
discovered. If an improvement might be called either one thing or another, dependent
upon motives and other surrounding circumstances, the investigator would have nothing
other than the representations in the bonds made by the officer in charge to show the
actual fact.
61
Mich. Laws (1943) Act 202.
62

6s

Id., § 4.
Id., § 7.

" Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1939) § 3304, provides that at least as to some bonds
there must be registration with the State Auditor. After his registration, which must
be preceded by a proper examination of the proceedings. the only defense which can be
6

93 2

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

it is evident that the legislature has clearly committed to a particular
officer or board decisions relating to facts on which the bonds could lawfully issue, there is ample authority that a certificate of registration or
approval forecloses the question when the validity of the bonds is
disputed. About the only defenses then left are the absence of legislation empowering the municipality to put out the bonds, forgery, or
fraud participated in by the holder. These give the securities the necessary attributes of commercial paper, and at the same time provide
greater taxpayer protection than the recital rule, by placing the decision with an' officer less likely to be ambitious to serve. some particular
group demanding the improvement, and consequent bond indebtedness.65
These particular provisions of the Michigan Municipal Finance
Commission Act were inspired by the costly lesson learned by holders
of drain district bonds, that the long established rule of estoppel from
bond recitals could be so restricted as to be of little support. When
further attempts at public debt repudiation occur, we may hope that a
full recognition of the legislative purpose in enacting these curative
provisions will serve bondholders as well as the estoppel rule as laid
down and interpreted in the federal courts, before Erie Railroad Co.

v. Tompkins.

·

offered against their validity is forgery ~r fraud, or that they are issued in excess of
a debt limit fixed by the constitution. Many registration statutes do not require any
examination of precedent conditions, hence do not foreclose defenses, but where the
registering officers are required to pass upon the regularity of the issue, the certification has the same effect as recitals. 6 McQuILLAN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs, 2d
ed., § 2434 (1937). Cairo v. Zane, 149 U.S. 122 at 141, 13 S.Ct. 803 (1895);
Flagg v. School District, 4 N.D. 30, 47, 58 N.W. 499 (1894).
65 In a few states legislation gives jurisdiction to the courts to entertain proceedings for validation of municipal bonds. The munkipality petitions for a decree
or judgment of validation, notice is published requiring taxpayers to file objections
if they have any, the court hears the matter and enters 'a decree, which the statute
provides shall be binding on the municipality and its taxpayers. A decree under the
Florida Statute, Fla. Laws (1941) c. 75, appears to put at rest all questions other than
the validity of the enabling statute. Ft. Myers v. State, 95 ·Fla. 704, 117 S. 97
(1928); Weinberger v. Bd. of Public Inst., 93 Fla. 470, 112 S. 253 (1927). In
Georgia and Mississippi the courts have declared that after such decree the bonds
are not open to question on any ground. Ga. Code (1933) §§ 87-301 to 87-310.
87-401 to 87-408; Goolsby v. Board of Drain Commissioners, 156 Ga. 213, 119
S.E. 644 (1923); Gibbs v. City of Social Circle, 191 Ga. 422, 12 S.E. (2d) 335
(1940); Miss. Code (1930) c. IO, §§ 312 to 317; Love v. Yazoo City, 162 Miss.
65, 138 s. 600 (1931).

